

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 NEA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02

INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAJ-01 OMB-01 ACDA-05 CU-02 ERDA-05 IO-10

OIC-02 SAM-01 TRSE-00 EB-07 STR-04 CIEP-01 FEAE-00

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R 241323Z OCT 75

FM AMEMBASSY PARIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4542

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY CAIRO

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 27671

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR FR UR

SUBJECT: GISCARD'S VISIT TO USSR

SUMMARY: ACCORDING TO QUAI'S HEAD NEGOTIATOR DURING GISCARD'S VISIT TO USSR, CSCE IMPLEMENTATION WAS THE MAJOR ISSUE. FRENCH LEANED HARD ON SOVIETS FOR A SIGNIFICANT BILATERAL FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT THE CSCE FINAL ACT. SOVIETS SEIZED OPPORTUNITY OF THIS FIRST VISIT BY WESTERN HEAD OF STATE AFTER HELSINKI TO REJECT IDEA OF BILATERAL CSCE AGREEMENT IN MOST UNAMBIGUOUS MANNER AS A LESSON NOT ONLY TO FRANCE BUT TO ALL WHO WILL COME AFTER. SOVIET SIGNALS OF DISSATISFACTION ALSO AIMED AT GISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICY WHICH APPEARS TO BE COUNTERING SOVIET INTERESTS, BUT SOVIET UNHAPPINESS NOT GREAT ENOUGH TO INHIBIT PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC EXCHANGES. END SUMMARY.

JACQUES ANDREANI, QUAI DIRECTOR FOR EUROPE, PROVIDED FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF GISCARD'S VISIT TO USSR LAST WEEK.

1. SOVIETS DISSATISFIED - BY PUBLISHING PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE CRITICISM OF FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN PRAVDA DURING GISCARD'S VISIT, AND BY CANCELLING A BREZHNEV-GISCARD MEETING, SOVIETS WERE SENDING A SIGNAL OF DISSATISFACTION. THEY WERE DISSATISFIED MAINLY BY HEAVY FRENCH PRESSURE FOR A MAJOR BILATERAL CSCE IMPLEMENTATION AGREEMENT. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO BECOMING UNHAPPY, IN ANDREANI'S VIEW, BY GISCARD'S EFFORTS TO REVIVE A SENSE OF ORDER AND SOLIDARITY IN RELATIONS AMONG THE WESTERN DEMOCRACIES.
2. CSCE IMPLEMENTATION - ANDREANI SAID HE WAS UNDER ORDERS TO NEGOTIATE A MAJOR BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO IMPLEMENT CSCE. HE PROPOSED THE SIGNING OF A FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION UNDER WHICH A FRANCO-SOVIET COMMISSION WOULD BE ESTABLISHED. THE COMMISSION WOULD HAVE BEEN EMPOWERED TO DRAFT SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS, AND COMMITTEES WOULD HAVE BEEN ESTABLISHED ON SPECIFIC SUB-CONFIDENTIAL

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JECTS. THE FIRST SUCH COMMITTEE PROPOSED WOULD HAVE DEALT WITH THE REUNITING OF SEPARATED FAMILIES ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS.

ANDREANI SAID THE SOVIETS REJECTED THE GOF PROPOSALS COMPLETELY AND WITHOUT ANY HOPE OF COMPROMISE. IN FACT, ANDREANI BELIEVES MAIN SOVIET OBJECTIVE DURING VISIT WAS TO REJECT FRENCH INITIATIVE. GISCARD WAS FIRST WESTERN

HEAD OF STATE TO VISIT MOSCOW AFTER HELSINKI, AND SOVIETS WANTED TO LET ALL WESTERN COUNTRIES KNOW UNAMBIGUOUSLY THAT BILATERAL AGREEMENTS TO IMPLEMENT CSCE ARE OUT OF THE QUESTION.

TO BACK UP HIS ANALYSIS, ANDREANI SAID THAT SOVIETS HAD CLEARLY ORCHESTRATED A LITANY OF HIGHEST LEVEL ATTACKS ON THE IDEA OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON CSCE. IN ONE PLENARY SESSION, BREZHNEV, GROMYKO, AND KOSYGIN INVEIGHED SERIATUM AGAINST THE IDEA. THE THRUST OF THE SOVIET ARGUMENT WAS THAT THE CSCE FINAL ACT IS A COMPLETE AND BALANCED DOCUMENT. TO NEGOTIATE SPECIFIC BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IMPLEMENTING ANY PORTION OF THE FINAL ACT, WITHOUT TAKING NOTICE OF ALL THE OTHER PORTIONS, INCLUDING THE OVERALL STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES. IN ORDER TO UPHOLD THE VIRGINITY OF THE FINAL ACT, EACH SIGNATORY MUST UNILATERALLY IMPLEMENT ITS PROVISIONS IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 27671

DURING NEGOTIATING SESSIONS, ANDREANI HEARD ONLY A SINGLE RESPONSE TO ALL HIS PROPOSALS--"THE SOVIET UNION PLEDGES TO IMPLEMENT FULLY ALL PROVISIONS OF THE FINAL ACT." DOBININ SAID THAT THE ONLY BILATERAL ACCORDS POSSIBLE WERE THOSE SPECIFICALLY ENVISAGED IN THE FINAL ACT, SUCH AS IMPROVED VISA SERVICES FOR JOURNALISTS. EVEN HERE, SOVIETS REFUSED TO INCLUDE A PROVISION ON JOURNALIST VISAS IN THE DECLARATION, ALTHOUGH THEY DID IN FACT SIGN A BILATERAL SIMILAR TO THE ONE WITH THE USA.

3. WHAT DID THE SOVIETS WANT TO ACHIEVE - ANDREANI SAID THAT APART FROM THEIR NEGATIVE OBJECTIVE OF REBUFFING THE FRENCH ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION, THE SOVIETS DID VERY LITTLE ARM TWISTING ON ANYTHING, INCLUDING MILITARY DETENTE. SOVIETS DID NOT BRING UP MBFR OR THE GENEVA DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. SOVIETS MADE THREE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN THIS AREA: (A) SOVIETS REQUESTED A STATEMENT IN DECLARATION CALLING FOR MILITARY DETENTE TO FOLLOW POLITICAL DETENTE. FRENCH REJECTED THIS COMPLETELY. (B) SOVIETS WANTED STATEMENT CALLING FOR ADHERENCE TO THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION. FRENCH REFUSED BECAUSE OF THEIR NON-

ADHERENCE TO NPT, BUT ACCEPTED Milder LANGUAGE. (C)
SOVIETS ASKED FOR STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED
AGREEMENT TO BAN WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, AND FRENCH
COMPROMISED BY AGREEING TO STUDY THE QUESTION. ANDREANI
SAID THAT FRENCH AGREEMENT TO EVEN MILD STATEMENT ON
NON-PROLIFERATION SHOULD BE SEEN AS A MAJOR POLITICAL
CONCESSION.

4. SOVIETS' SIGNALS OF DISSATISFACTION - ANDREANI
CONCLUDED BY SAYING SOVIETS' QUASI-HOSTILE GESTURES
DURING VISIT WENT A BIT BEYOND DISSATISFACTION WITH GOF
PRESSURE FOR A BILATERAL. THERE IS ALSO DISSATISFACTION
WITH GISCARD'S FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH IS DESIGNED TO
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REVIVE WESTERN SOLIDARITY THROUGH SUCH DEVICES AS THE
NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE AND THE MONETARY SUMMIT. THE
SOVIETS, ACCORDING TO ANDREANI, WERE MORE COMFORTABLE
WITH THE DISRUPTIVE POSTURE SYMBOLIZED BY FORMER FOREIGN
MINISTER JOBERT. ANDREANI SAID THAT INTERNAL SOVIET
POLITICS IN RELATION TO THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
COULD ALSO NOT BE EXCLUDED AS AN ELEMENT IN SOVIET
COMPORTMENT DURING THE VISIT, NOT THAT THE FATE OF
THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY IS NECESSARILY IMPORTANT TO
THE SOVIETS. BUT THE FACT THAT THE PCF IS SUFFERING
AS A RESULT OF FRANCO-SOVIET DETENTE CAN BE UTILIZED
AS AN ARGUMENT BY THE KREMLIN HAWKS WHO OPPOSE DETENTE.
HENCE, THE PUBLICATION OF A PCF CENTRAL COMMITTEE STATE-
MENT BY PRAVDA DURING THE VISIT COULD HAVE BEEN A GES-
TURE TO THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS TO APPEASE THE SOVIET
HAWKS.

5. ECONOMIC RESULTS - ANDREANI SAID GOF WAS VERY
PLEASED BY RESULTS OF ECONOMIC DISCUSSIONS. SOVIETS
MADE MAJOR EFFORT TO COMPLETE DETAILS OF FIVE ECONOMIC
AGREEMENTS WHICH WERE NOT YET READY TEN DAYS BEFORE THE
VISIT. SOVIETS HAD RUSHED TO CONTRACT FOR FIVE BILLION
FRANCS WORTH OF GOODS AND SERVICES BEFORE FRENCH INTER-
EST RATES WENT UP IN DECEMBER 1974. CONSEQUENTLY, GOF
EXPECTED 1975 CONTRACTS TO BE WORTH LESS THAN HALF THE
1974 AMOUNT. BUT 1974 TOTAL WILL BE BETWEEN FOUR AND
FIVE BILLION FRANCS, ANDREANI STATED WITH PLEASURE. AS
FAR AS FRENCH OIL PURCHASES FROM THE SOVIET UNION ARE
CONCERNED, ANDREANI CONFIRMED WHAT EMBASSY HAS ALREADY
HEARD (PARIS 27388), THAT FRENCH WILL MAKE AN EFFORT TO
INCREASE IMPORTS, BUT WILL HAVE DIFFICULTIES ABSORBING
MORE SOVIET CRUDE BECAUSE OF STABILIZED CONSUMPTION AND
HIGH PARAFFIN CONTENT.

6. COMMENT: ON BASIS FOREGOING REPORT, AS WELL AS

EXCELLENT REPORTS FROM EMBASSY MOSCOW, WE CONCLUDE THAT FRANCO-SOVIET RELATIONS WILL REMAIN ON EVEN KEEL, ESPECIALLY IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD. BUT THE IDEA OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, WHICH ALWAYS HAD A HEAVY ELEMENT OF MYTHOLOGY IN ANY EVENT, APPEARS TO BE OBJECTIVELY DEAD. AS MICHEL DEBRE SAID SO PER-
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CEPTIVELY IN LE MONDE OCTOBER 22, THE SOVIET UNION CAN OBJECTIVELY HAVE A PRIVILEGED RELATIONSHIP ONLY WITH THE UNITED STATES.
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